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Relationship Banking and Loan Syndicate Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors
Rongbing Huang, Donghang Zhang, and Yijia (Eddie) Zhao

The Financial Review, forthcoming

Abstract
Using a sample of syndicated loans to private equity (PE)-backed IPO companies, we examine
how a third-party bank relationship influences the syndicate structure of a loan. We find that a
stronger relationship between the lead bank and the borrower’s PE firm enables the lead bank to
retain a smaller share of the loan and form a larger and less concentrated syndicate, especially
when the borrower is less transparent. A stronger PE-bank relationship also attracts greater foreign
bank participation. Our findings suggest that the lead bank’s relationship with a large equity holder
of the borrower facilitates information production in lending.
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1. Introduction
We examine how the relationship between a bank and a borrower’s equity blockholder,
which we call a third-party bank relationship, affects information production in lending. Using a
sample of syndicated loans made to U.S. initial public offering (IPO) companies backed by private
equity (PE) firms, we study the effect of the relationship between a bank and a PE firm on
information production in the syndicated loans market. 1 For loans made to PE-backed IPO
companies, we find that a stronger PE-bank relationship is associated with a lower lead bank share,
a larger and less concentrated syndicate, and a higher probability of foreign bank participation,
suggesting that PE-bank relationships facilitate information production in lending. These results
also suggest that PE-bank relationships allow a PE-backed borrower to have better access to capital
and make it possible for the lead bank to free up its capital and lend more to other borrowers.
Theories predict that PE-bank relationships can influence the informational environment
of a PE-backed IPO company in taking a loan. When the PE firm possesses private information
about the IPO company, a stronger relationship between the PE firm and the bank could catalyze
a more efficient acquisition and sharing of information about the borrower, thereby reducing the
lead bank’s costs of due diligence and monitoring. However, the lead bank’s relationship with the
PE firm could augment the bank’s informational advantage over other potential lenders, imposing
undesired costs on the borrower if it sidelines the other lenders and leads to adverse selection/holdup problems (Rajan, 1992). Even if PE-bank relationships lower the lead bank’s due diligence and
monitoring costs, the bank could have an informational monopoly that prevents it from sharing the

1

PE firms are active players in the syndicated loans market and build relationships with banks (Ivashina and Kovner,
2011). PE firms often retain influential equity stakes and/or serve on the boards of their portfolio companies in the
first several years after the companies go public (Cao and Lerner, 2009; Huang, Ritter, and Zhang, 2016). PEsponsored IPOs include both reversed leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) and IPOs of private companies that were bought
by PE firms and did not go through a public-to-private transition. The PE sponsor of an IPO is not necessarily the
sponsor of a post-IPO loan. Unless the context suggests otherwise, a PE sponsor in this paper refers to the fact that the
PE firm is the sponsor of the borrower’s recent IPO, not the loan.
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benefits with the borrower. It is also possible that PE-bank relationships no longer matter once the
borrower becomes public. Therefore, it is an empirical question as of which effect, if any, of the
PE-bank relationship on post-IPO lending dominates.
We study the effect of PE-bank relationship on loan syndicate structure, an important
aspect of lending. The literature suggests that information asymmetries between a borrower and
its lender(s) and within a lending syndicate are a critical determinant of the syndicate structure
(e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009; Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli,
2011; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2012). The lead bank of a syndicated loan package conducts
due diligence on the borrower and markets the loan package to a group of potential participant
lenders. The lead bank is also responsible for ex post monitoring of the borrower during the life of
the loan. Because the lead bank owns only a fraction of the loan but bears virtually all of the due
diligence and monitoring costs, it has an incentive to shirk due diligence/monitoring
responsibilities when its efforts are imperfectly observable to the participant lenders. Furthermore,
the lead bank has an incentive to allocate a larger share of a lower quality loan to the participant
banks (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). The participant banks are more concerned about these moral
hazard and adverse selection problems when information asymmetries among the borrower, the
lead bank, and the participant banks are greater. In equilibrium, the lead bank holds a larger
fraction of the loan to mitigate the participant banks’ concerns when there is greater asymmetric
information.
We test two competing hypotheses. The efficient information production hypothesis posits
that a stronger relationship between the PE firm and the lead bank reduces the costs for the lead
bank to investigate and monitor the underlying borrower, and thus alleviate potential participant
banks’ concerns about the lead bank’s incentive to shirk due diligence/monitoring responsibilities.

2

This hypothesis predicts a negative association between the lead bank’s share of the loan and the
PE-lead bank relationship. The exclusive informational advantage hypothesis, on the contrary,
suggests that a stronger relationship between the PE firm and the lead bank elevates the lead bank’s
informational advantage over the participant lenders, which become more concerned about getting
more of a lower quality loan. This hypothesis predicts a positive association between the lead
bank’s share of the loan and the PE-lead bank relationship.
We analyze syndicate structures for a sample of 291 syndicated loans to PE-backed IPO
companies between 1995 and 2011. Our primary measure of a PE-bank relationship is the ratio of
the total dollar amount of loans from this particular bank and sponsored by this particular PE firm
over the total dollar amount of all loans sponsored by the PE firm during the past five years. Our
findings strongly support the efficient information production hypothesis. Lead banks retain
significantly smaller factions of loans made to PE-backed IPO companies when these banks have
stronger prior lending relationships with the PE firms. A stronger PE-bank relationship also relates
to a less concentrated syndicate (measured by the Herfindahl index of loan shares of all lenders in
the syndicate). Economically, one of our regressions shows that a one-standard-deviation increase
in the PE-bank relationship allows the lead bank to hold 6.44% less of a loan. For our sample of
loans to PE-backed IPO companies, the average loan amount is $216 million with the average lead
bank share of 51%. If we assume that the lead bank can only provide $110 million for a loan due
to regulatory capital constraints, a 6.44% decrease from 51% to 44.56% in the lead bank share
would imply an increase of $31 million in the loan amount to $247 million. Such an increase in
credit supply can be important for many IPO companies.
Our results also suggest that PE-bank relationships and their effects on syndicate structure
are beneficial to a lead bank. If the lead bank of a loan can hold 6.44% or $14 million less of the
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loan when the PE-bank relationship increases by one standard deviation, the bank could hold $96
million instead of $110 million. If the bank has $1.1 billion to lend, it can hold a portfolio of 11.5
loans instead of 10 loans. Practitioners emphasize that a loan’s yield on a stand-alone basis is often
not attractive to a bank in terms of its risk-return tradeoff. The bank often evaluates a loan as a
component of a portfolio of all businesses with the borrower (S&P, 2016). Lending to more
companies can be very beneficial to a bank as it can develop relationships with more borrowers
and gain opportunities of cross-selling other banking products.
The negative effect of PE-bank relationship on lead bank share and syndicate concentration
is robust when we control for loan characteristics, the lead bank and PE firm reputations, the
borrower-lead bank relationship, the lead bank’s underwriting relationships with the borrower, and
the borrower-participant banks relationship. These results are also robust with controlling for the
lead bank and PE firm fixed effects.
The effect of PE-bank relationship on lead bank share could reflect a selection bias. A PE
firm could select a bank with which it has a stronger relationship as the lead bank for a loan to a
better portfolio company. To alleviate this concern, we use the strongest bank relationship of the
PE firm measured prior to the current loan as the instrumental variable (IV). This IV correlates
with the PE firm’s relationship with the lead bank of the current loan, but it does not correlate with
the borrower’s quality because it is measured prior to the selection of the lead bank. The effect of
PE-bank relationships on the lead bank’s loan share in our two-stage least square (2SLS)
regressions is qualitatively similar to that in the OLS regressions, suggesting that our results are
not driven by the selection of a stronger relationship bank for a higher quality borrower.
Consistent with its role in reducing the lead bank share, a strong PE-bank relationship also
attracts more lenders to the syndicate, increases the probability of having a non-U.S. participant
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lender, and associates with a shorter syndication process. In the cross-section, the effect of PEbank relationships is more pronounced for more informationally opaque borrowers. These findings
provide further support for the efficient information production hypothesis rather than the exclusive
informational advantage hypothesis.2
Taken together, our results shed new light on the scope of information production by
financial intermediaries. The literature on relationship banking focuses on how the bilateral
relationship between the borrower and its bank incentivizes information production (e.g., Sharpe,
1990; Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot, 2000; Ongena and
Smith, 2000; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2011). We show that the relationship
between a borrower’s shareholder and bank also facilitates information production. This is a new
layer of bank relationship that has not been closely examined in the literature.
Our paper also sheds light on the benefits of relationship lending for banks. Ivashina and
Kovner (2011) shows that the yield spread on a leveraged buyout (LBO) loan is negatively related
to the PE sponsor’s previous relationships with the lead lender. A lower loan spread benefits the
borrower. We focus on lead bank share, a non-pecuniary measure. A negative association between
PE-bank relationship and lead bank share can benefit both the borrower and the lead bank. The
borrower can gain greater credit supply as the participant banks contribute more of the loan. The
lead bank can free up its capital to lend more to other borrowers (Chu, Zhang, and Zhao, 2017),
which can provide significant benefits to the bank in developing broader relationship lending.
Finally, our focus on post-IPO financing broadens our understanding of the long-term

2

We also show that differences in syndicate structure is unlikely to be reflected or compensated for in loan pricing.
In unreported results, we regress lead bank share on loan spread along with other control variables and find no
significant association between lead bank share and loan spread. That is, lead banks retain a lower share but not at the
cost of a higher spread for the borrower.
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influence of PE firms as a special (and sometimes controversial) group of investors.3 PE firms
have significant equity stakes in an increasing number of U.S. companies. The fraction of U.S.
IPOs backed by PE firms has increased substantially from the 1990s to the 2000s (Huang, Ritter,
and Zhang, 2016). PE-backed IPOs tend to have better stock and operating performance than other
IPOs (e.g., Cao and Lerner, 2009; Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song, 2011). Although they face less
information asymmetry than private companies, new public companies are still prone to
information asymmetry problems and often have great needs for external financing (Helwege and
Liang, 1996; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009; Bouwman and Lowry, 2012; Hertzel, Huson, and
Parrino, 2012). It is important if a PE sponsor can help an IPO company gain access to extra credit
by alleviating informational problems faced by the company. Our results provide an explanation
for the superior performance of PE-backed IPO companies.
2. Hypothesis development
In a syndicated loan, a group of lenders lend to a borrower and the lead bank originates the
loan and performs due diligence and monitoring (Esty, 2001; Ivashina and Sun, 2011). Information
asymmetries affect the syndication outcome (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). On one level, agency
problems exist due to information asymmetries between the borrower and its lender(s). Costly due
diligence and monitoring by the lender(s) is necessary to mitigate such problems (e.g., Harris and
Raviv, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979; Smith and Warner, 1979). There are also incentive problems for
the lead bank due to information asymmetry within the syndicate. Because the lead bank passes
along a portion of the loan to the participant lenders, there is an adverse selection concern among
the participant lenders that they receive more low quality loans. Because the lead bank is also the

3

PE sponsors can bring in more effective monitoring to their portfolio companies and provide management with a
stronger incentive to improve efficiency (Jensen, 1986; Kaplan, 1989). Alternatively, PE sponsors could gain via
transferring wealth from other stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Warga and Welch, 1993).
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“delegated monitor” of the syndicate, it has an incentive to shirk monitoring when its monitoring
effort cannot be observed and thus fairly compensated by the participant banks (Diamond, 1984).
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) suggest that in equilibrium the lead bank has to hold a certain portion
of a loan that it syndicates so the other lenders can be assured that the borrower is of acceptable
quality and will be monitored properly. The lead bank has to take a larger fraction of a loan if the
borrower requires more intense due diligence and greater monitoring effort. Consequently, if there
exists a PE-bank relationship that can reduce due diligence and monitoring costs, more lenders
will participate in the syndicate and provide more funding for the loan.
A prior relationship with a PE firm, who is often an informed equity blockholder, can help
the bank to acquire valuable borrower-specific information. A PE firm is likely to possess some
proprietary information, including “soft” information, on the IPO company that used to be part of
its portfolio. PE firms engage in financial, governance, and operational engineering to enhance the
valuations of their portfolio companies (Kaplan, Sensoy, and Strömberg, 2009; Gompers, Kaplan,
and Mukharlyamov, 2015; Malenko and Malenko, 2015). Such efforts are likely to have a longterm effect on the companies (Cao and Lerner, 2009). Due to their considerable involvement in
these companies before the IPO, PE firms could have a vision for the companies’ investment plans,
cash flow projections, etc. Such information can help a bank determine the borrower’s future
prospect. The PE firm could also hold private information about the characteristics of the
borrower’s management teams. Such knowledge can help a bank better assess the borrower’s
management competence.4
A good example for a PE firm’s “soft” information and influence is Blackstone’s Hilton LBO. This is one of the
most lucrative private equity deals in history: Blackstone made $9 billion profit at Hilton’s IPO on December 13, 2013
on a $5.6 billion investment in the LBO deal. Blackstone bought Hilton in the fall of 2007, at the peak of the real
estate boom. The deal’s success is not due to its timing. Instead, the choice of Christopher Nassetta as CEO, Hilton’s
reconstructing for focusing on overseas markets and luxury brands, and Hilton’s voluntary restructuring of its debt
with its 26 creditors during the financial crisis are probably among the important reasons. Blackstone’s expertise and
bank relationships likely contributed to the success of the debt restructuring. See Willian D. Cohan’s story on the
4
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PE firms have the incentive to reveal information on borrowers to their relationship banks.
PE firms generally still have large equity ownership in PE-backed IPO companies in the first few
years after the IPO.5 If reduced asymmetric information lowers financing costs of an IPO company,
the PE firm would also benefit as a significant stakeholder. Even when the PE firm no longer has
large ownership in a PE-backed IPO company at the time of the loan, its general partner(s) could
still serve as a board member of the borrower. A PE firm’s reputational concerns and ongoing
interactions with its relationship lenders could also induce truthful revelation of borrower
information (Huang, Ritter, and Zhang, 2016).
Taken together, the above arguments lead to our first hypothesis, which we call the efficient
information production hypothesis:
H1: Efficient Information Production Hypothesis: All else being equal, a stronger PE-bank
relationship facilitates the lead bank’s information production about the borrower and
thus allows a smaller lead bank share and a less concentrated lending syndicate.
Nonetheless, it is possible that communication between the PE firm and the lead bank
elevates the lead bank’s informational advantage over potential participant lenders, who could
become more concerned about potential adverse selection problems.6 Information acquired by the
lead bank via the PE firm-bank relationship channel could be “soft,” thereby not easily
transferrable. When the participant banks do not have the same access to such information as the
lead bank does, they could peg a large loan allocation as a “lemon” regardless of its true credit

Hilton deal, “Blackstone’s $26 Billion Hilton Deal: The Best Leveraged Buyout Ever”, in Bloomberg Businessweek
(September 11, 2014), for more details. Three Blackstone-affiliated directors remained on the board nearly one year
after Hilton’s IPO. So it is very plausible that, in any post-IPO lending to Hilton, the lenders would benefit from their
relationships with Blackstone and from Blackstone’s soft information and influence on Hilton.
5
We hand-collected lead PE firms’ equity ownership data from SEC filings at the time of loan inceptions. Among the
291 loans, we were able to identify PE sponsor’s equity ownerships of 226 loans. The mean (median) equity holding
of PE firm is 29.5% (22.2%).
6
Relationships and communications with a third-party PE firm can help reduce the “distance” between the lead bank
and the borrower (e.g., Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).
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quality. If this adverse selection concern prevails, the lead bank must keep a large share of the loan
to certify the loan quality. Therefore, a stronger PE-bank relationship would be associated with a
larger lead bank holding of the loan. This leads to our alternative hypothesis, which we call the
exclusive informational advantage hypothesis:
H2: Exclusive Informational Advantage Hypothesis: All else being equal, a stronger PEbank relationship aggravates the potential participant banks’ concern about getting
greater allocations of a lower quality loan, so the lead bank has to retain a larger share
of the loan and form a more concentrated lending syndicate.
3. Data, variable definitions, and summary statistics
3.1 Data
To construct our sample, we start with 97,731 bank loans (a.k.a., facilities) to U.S.
companies with an origination year between 1995 and 2011 in the DealScan database.7 Among
them, 34,687 facilities can be linked to the Compustat Annual database and the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) database and have key Compustat and CRSP data available in the fiscal
year prior to the facility start date.8 We match these loan facilities to Thomson Reuters IPO data
and find IPO information for 17,332 facilities. Information for the founding year of the IPO
company is available for 17,224 facilities.9 Key facility characteristics (facility amount, maturity,
yield spread, performance pricing, and secured status) are available for 11,026 facilities. Among

7

Multiple facilities can belong to the same loan package. All facilities in a package share the same contract terms such
as covenants, but they differ in loan type (e.g., credit lines and term loans), maturity, yield spreads, and other features.
Lender identities and their funding contributions are available at the facility level, so we focus on facilities.
8
We downloaded the DealScan database from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) in May 2013, together
with the August 2012 version of the DealScan-Compustat link file. See Chava and Roberts (2008) for details about
the link file. DealScan includes loans to private companies, which are excluded when CRSP data are required.
9
The founding date of a RLBO company is the founding date of its predecessor company (Loughran and Ritter, 2004).
We thank Jay Ritter for sharing the IPO founding year data.
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them, we keep 4,223 facilities that are made within five years after the IPO.10 We examine loans
within five years after the IPO because PE firms have a reduced influence on their portfolio
companies as the time goes on. We require the IPO date to fall between 1995-2011 because the
SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) filing information
became available from 1995. As a result, we are able to collect and verify information on PE
sponsors from the IPO prospectus. This requirement allows us to retain 2,973 of the 4,223 facilities.
For each of the 2,973 facilities, we follow Ivashina (2009) and Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders,
and Srinivasan (2011) to identify its lead arranging bank(s). More specifically, if an administrative
agent of a facility is identified, it is defined as the lead bank. If the syndicate does not have an
administrative agent, lenders carrying the titles of agent, arranger, book-runner, lead arranger, lead
bank, or lead manager are defined as the lead bank(s). We keep 2,920 facilities whose lead bank’s
role can be identified and whose market share information (as a proxy of reputation) can be
computed. Of the 2,920 facilities, 824 facilities are made to PE-backed IPO companies.
Our analysis on the lead bank share requires a measure for the lead bank’s contribution of
funds as a fraction of the total facility amount. The DealScan database reports the number of
lenders in a facility. For the facilities with only one lender, we set the lead bank share to 100%.
The DealScan database provides information on the fraction, or share, of a facility amount
contributed by each lender, but such information is unavailable for many facilities in the original
database. Among the 2,920 facilities, 1,627 facilities have lender share information, including 291
facilities to 151 unique PE-backed IPO companies and 1,336 facilities to 759 non-PE-backed IPO

10

Most loans during the first year after the IPO are also excluded because we require stock returns over the 200 trading
days ending 11 days prior to the loan start date to compute the beta coefficient and the return volatility of each
borrower’s stock.
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companies.11 Our analysis focuses on the 291 facilities to PE-backed IPO companies.
Our focus on the post-IPO loan sample rather than LBO loans extends the literature on
relationship banking and the role of private equity firms. First, PE firms on average have lower
equity ownership in their portfolio companies in the first several years after the IPO than at the
LBO. It is important to know whether PE firms continue to play an important role in alleviating
information asymmetry problems facing their portfolio companies after the IPO when they have
lower equity ownership. Second, the IPO of a company entails substantial changes in the
company’s informational environment, its bargaining power with regard to its lenders, the
secondary trading market for its loans, and its ownership structure (e.g., Schenone, 2010; Saunders
and Steffen, 2011). Whether a PE-bank relationship brings about benefits to public firms remains
an open empirical question. Finally, the better availability of firm-level data in the post-IPO era
enables us to control for a broader set of borrower characteristics as they have been shown to affect
syndicate structures.
3.2 Variable definitions
Following the literature, we construct two measures of PE-bank relationship strength (e.g.,
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2007, 2011; Ivashina and Kovner, 2011). Our main
measure, PE-Bank Relationship ($), is based on the dollar amount of previous loans. Suppose an
IPO company takes a loan for which the lead bank is m. The company’s IPO was sponsored by PE
firm k. For this specific loan, PE firm k’s prior relationship with bank m is equal to the total dollar
amount of loans sponsored by PE firm k from lead bank m of the current facility in the past five
years scaled by the total dollar amount of loans sponsored by PE firm k in the past five years, using

11

There are cases where shares of only some (but not all) lenders within a facility are reported. To ensure accuracy,
we exclude such cases from our sample. We also drop those facilities with obviously incorrect lender share information
(e.g. those facilities when lender shares add up to far more than 100%).
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all sponsored loans in the DealScan database. The second measure, PE-Bank Relationship (#), is
based on the number of previous loans. It is equal to the total number of loans sponsored by PE
firm k from lead bank m of the current facility in the past five years divided by the number of loan
facilities sponsored by PE firm k in the past five years.12
An IPO company is sometimes backed by several PE firms (i.e., club deals). In these cases,
the PE-Bank Relationship is the relationship between the primary PE sponsor and the lead bank.
We define the primary PE sponsor as the one that has the largest equity stake in the company
among all PE sponsors at the time of the IPO. If several PE sponsors have the same largest equity
stake, we use the first one listed in the IPO prospectus. Our definition of a PE-bank relationship
does not differentiate between individual funds under the same PE firm. For example, we would
give “Castle Harlan Partners” 40% equity ownership if “Castle Harlan Partners II” fund has 10%
and “Castle Harlan Partners IV” fund has 30% in an IPO company. Also, we follow Ivashina and
Kovner (2011) to use the highest PE-Bank Relationship value when there are multiple lead banks
in a facility.
The dependent variables in our regressions are the lead bank’s share of the loan, syndicate
concentration (measured by the Herfindahl index), syndicate size, foreign lender participation, and
time-on-the-market (defined in Section 4.5). Their definitions, along with those of the explanatory
variables, can be found in Appendix A1.

12

PE sponsor names for each IPO company are hand-collected from the IPO prospectus and cross-checked with and
matched to the DealScan loan sponsor names. We only include loans with PE firm k being listed as a loan sponsor
when we calculate the relationship measure between PE firm k and bank m. That is, we do not include non-sponsored
post-IPO loans to PE-backed IPO companies. We do so for two reasons. First, including these loans is unlikely to
materially change our PE-bank relationship measures, because the number of sponsored loans in DealScan is much
larger than the number of non-sponsored post-IPO loans to PE-backed IPO companies and because LBO loans are
often larger than other loans. Second, the relationship measures based on sponsored loans are consistent with the
literature (e.g., Ivashina and Kovner, 2011), and this makes our results more comparable.
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3.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the full sample of 1,627 loans for which we have
lender share information. We also report the summary statistics for the loans to PE-backed and
non-PE-backed IPO companies separately. The Lead Bank Share is the fraction of a loan facility
held by the lead bank. The mean value of this variable is 0.73 and the median value is 1 for the
full sample.13 Both the mean and the median values of the lead bank share are smaller for the loans
to PE-backed companies than those for the loans to non-PE-backed companies. A similar pattern
is observed for the Herfindahl Index of lender shares in a facility.
The mean value of No. of All Lenders per facility is 4.07 for the full sample. The loans to
PE-backed companies tend to have a larger syndicate than the loans to non-PE-backed companies.
A foreign lender is a participant lender for 20% of the loan facilities in the full sample. A foreign
lender is more likely to be a participant lender for the loans to PE-backed IPO companies than for
the loans to non-PE-backed IPO companies.
The average All-In-Spread Drawn for the full sample is 241.20 basis points. On average,
PE-backed IPO companies carry a lower overall loan cost than other IPO companies.14 On average,
the loans to PE-backed companies are larger and have longer maturities than those to other IPO
companies.
In summary, relative to the loans to other IPO companies, the loans to PE-backed IPO
companies are larger, and have lower yield spreads, longer maturity, a lower lead bank share, a
larger and more concentrated syndicate, and a higher probability of foreign bank participation.
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Our average lead bank share is larger than those reported in Sufi (2007) and Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli (2011)
for two reasons. First, we set the lead bank share to 100% if the lead bank share is missing and the number of lenders
equals one, while they exclude all loans when the lead bank share is missing. Second, the size of loans in our sample
is much smaller than that in theirs.
14
In unreported regressions, we find that PE sponsorships and PE-bank relationships help lower the net loan yield
spreads (the all-in-spreads after upfront fees), but there exists no significant relations between PE-bank relationships
and the all-in-spreads.
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These results suggest that banks share some of the benefits of PE-bank relationships with
borrowers.
The average value of the continuous measure for the PE-bank relationship constructed
using the dollar amount, PE-Bank Relationship ($), is 0.13 for the subsample of 291 loans to PEbacked companies with non-missing lender share information. The continuous measure for the PEbank relationship has similar mean values when it is constructed using the number of deals. The
lenders to PE-backed IPO companies have a larger market share (Lead Lender Reputation) and are
more likely to have a prior lending relationship with the borrowers (i.e., a smaller mean value for
the New Lender Dummy).
Table 1 also reports the summary statistics of key borrower-specific characteristics at the
time of loan origination. With an average age of 18.26 years, the companies in our full sample tend
to be younger than the bond issuers in Huang, Ritter, and Zhang (2016). This is consistent with
Diamond (1989), who reports that younger companies tend to use private bank debt. On average,
PE-backed IPO companies have higher leverage than other IPO companies, consistent with the
conjecture that PE-bank relationships allow PE-backed companies to borrow more.
4. Regression results
4.1 PE-bank relationship and syndicate structure: Baseline regressions
We first estimate our baseline ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the effect of PEbank relationships on loan syndicate structures for the sample of the 291 loans to PE-sponsored
IPO companies. The analysis using the PE-backed sample provides a cleaner test of the PE-bank
relationship effect because we can largely ignore possible differences in loan syndicate structure
caused by the general effect of a PE firm.
Table 2 reports the results. In all regressions in this table, as well as in the subsequent tables,
14

we take advantage of the financial data availability for these IPO companies in our sample and
control for many company-level proxies for borrower risk. We also include year dummies to
capture changes in the macroeconomic environment, and Fama-French 17 industry dummies to
control for industry effects.15 Loan type and deal package purpose fixed effects are also included
to account for differences among loans that are used for diverse corporate aims. For brevity, the
coefficients on these dummy variables are not reported.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the estimated effect of PE-bank relationships on the share held
by the lead bank. In model (1), we use the continuous measure of prior lending relationship
between the PE firm and the lead bank, PE-Bank Relationship ($). The coefficient on this variable
is -0.28 and is statistically significant at the one percent level. This result suggests that, after
controlling for observable borrower characteristics, a stronger prior PE-bank relationship results
in a significantly smaller share held by the lead bank in the loan. We find a similar effect if we use
the PE-Bank Relationship (#) as an alternative measure of relationship strength in model (2). These
results are consistent with the efficient information production hypothesis.
The coefficient on PE-Bank Relationship ($) in model (1) is also economically meaningful.
A one-standard-deviation increase in the PE-Bank Relationship ($), which is 0.23 as reported in
Table 1, decreases the share of the lead bank by 0.28×0.23=6.44%. Given that the average amount
for the sample of loans to PE-sponsored IPO companies is about $215.81 million, a 6.44% decrease
in the lead bank share is roughly equivalent to a $13.9 million reduction of required capital
contribution by the lead bank. In the syndicated loans market, a bank’s capital level is shown to

The lead bank that has a strong relationship with the borrower’s PE firm could have too much exposure to the PE
firm’s portfolio companies. Consequently, the lead bank could have an incentive to reduce its share of the loan to the
PE-backed borrower. Our controls for borrower risk, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects should help alleviate
such risk-management influences on our major results on the role of PE-bank relationships in alleviating information
asymmetry problems in lending.
15
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have a significant effect on the size of funding that the bank can contribute to a loan (Chu, Zhang,
and Zhao, 2017). For our sample, a bank can use $1.1 billion in capital to fund ten loans on average
for PE-backed IPO companies (the average contribution of funding is $110 million, or 51% of the
average loan size of $215.8 million as reported in Table 1). If the bank can use $13.9 million less
of its capital for a loan, $1.1 billion would fund 11.5 loans. Banks rely on relationships with
borrowers and cross-selling, as the risk-return tradeoff for a loan on a stand-alone basis is often
not attractive for the bank due to capital regulations (S&P, 2016). The 15% increase from 10 to
11.5 loans can benefit the bank as it can gain more opportunities to establish relationships with
borrowers.
PE-bank relationships can also benefit the borrower by increasing its credit supply. If the
lead bank can only contribute $110 million (51% of a $215.8 million loan), a reduction in lead
bank share from 51% to 44.56% implies that the loan size will be increased from $215.8 million
to $246.9 million. A $31 million increase in credit supply can be important for an IPO company.
Panel B of Table 2 reports similar effects of PE-bank relationships using the Herfindahl
Index. This finding again supports the efficient information production hypothesis: When a strong
PE-bank relationship facilitates information acquisition, the lead bank can form a less concentrated
syndicate (i.e., have a broader loan investor base). In summary, the baseline results reported in
Table 2 suggest that PE-bank relationships can facilitate information production in lending, and
can benefit both the lead bank (more lending and cross-selling opportunities) and the borrowing
company (greater credit supply).
4.2 PE-bank relationship and syndicate structure: Expanded regressions
In this subsection, we estimate expanded regressions to address some concerns about other
confounding factors that could drive our baseline results. First, it is possible that both the borrower
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and the PE firm have a relationship with the lead bank. We check to see whether the PE-bank
relationship is important after controlling for the borrower-bank relationship.16
Second, the reputation concern of a lead bank could deter it from shirking monitoring
(Diamond, 1989; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). A lender’s good reputation can also certify its
ability of information collection as well as the quality of a borrower. Thus, we control for a lender’s
market share in the syndicated loan market in dollar amount in the five years prior to the current
loan as a proxy for the lender’s reputation. Another reason to control for lender reputation is that
this variable could be correlated with PE-bank relationships because a lender with a larger market
share would naturally have a higher probability to be selected as the lead bank in a deal.
Third, a lead bank can use certain loan characteristics as alternative means to demonstrate
its commitment to information collection and monitoring (e.g., Rajan and Winton, 1995; Cerqueiro,
Ongena, and Roszbach, 2016). If PE-bank relationships affect the lead bank’s incentive to acquire
information, they could influence the usage of covenants and collateral. Thus, we control for loan
covenants and collateral requirements to avoid the potential problem of omitted variables . A lead
bank will probably hold a smaller share when the loan is larger (Sufi, 2007). If some banks lead
larger loan deals more often, they could form stronger relationships with PE firms, resulting in a
negative relation between PE-bank relationships and the lead bank share. Thus, we control for loan
size to alleviate such effects.
Finally, we control for a PE firm’s reputation in the syndicated loans market. A PE firm
would become more recognized as they repeatedly access the loan market. A PE firm with good
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In our sample, PE-backed IPO companies include those that had been through leveraged buyouts and those that had
never been public before the IPO. A borrower, especially a company that had never been public before the IPO, could
have developed a relationship with a bank through the help of the borrower’s PE sponsor. Therefore, borrower-bank
relationships at least partially capture the effect of PE-bank relationships. Our controlling for the borrower-bank
relationship thus biases against us finding an effect for the PE-bank relationship.
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reputation could also mitigate information asymmetry problems of the borrowing company
(Demiroglu and James, 2010; Huang, Ritter, and Zhang, 2016). We use the natural log of total
dollar amount of borrowing by a PE firm in the past five years to represent its reputation in the
loan market and control for it in our regressions.
We present the expanded regression results with the aforementioned additional control
variables in Table 3. Before we discuss the results, note that our reduced-form baseline models in
Table 2 have the advantage of avoiding potential endogeneity problems associated with the
simultaneous determination of the aforementioned control variables and the dependent variable.
In Table 3 we only report the results using the PE-bank relationship measures based on previous
deal amounts. Our results using the relationship measures based on the number of previous deals
are qualitatively similar.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the regression results using the lead bank share as the dependent
variable. The dependent variable in Panel B of Table 3 is the Herfindahl Index, with results similar
to those in Panel A of Table 3. Our discussion will focus on Panel A of Table 3. Model (1) in Panel
A of Table 3 is the same as model (1) in Table 2 except that we include a number of loan
characteristics as additional control variables. We control for the Lead Lender Reputation, New
Lender Dummy (as a control for borrower-bank relationship), and PE Firm Reputation in model
(2) in Table 3. After controlling for observable loan characteristics, borrower-bank relationship,
and bank and PE reputation, a strong PE-bank relationship still significantly reduces the lead bank
share. The coefficients on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) change little compared to those in Panel
A of Table 2 and are still statistically significant at the one percent level.
In model (2) of Panel A of Table 3, the coefficient on the New Lender Dummy is 0.12 and
is statistically significant at the one percent level. This result indicates that, all else being equal,
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lending to a new borrower requires the lead bank to hold more of the loan to signal commitment
for information production. The coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is also statistically
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that PE firm-bank relationship is at least as
important as borrower-bank relationship in facilitating information production.
The coefficients on the Lead Lender Reputation and PE Firm Reputation are negative but
not statistically significant, providing some weak evidence that reputations of the lead bank and
the PE sponsor could mitigate information asymmetry problems.
4.3 Endogeneity of PE-bank relationships
In this subsection, we conduct more robustness tests to show that our main findings are
likely to be causal. First, we re-estimate both the baseline and the expanded regression models
using a lead bank fixed effects model. The lead bank fixed effects model removes any effects that
time-invariant bank characteristics might have on the association between PE-bank relationships
and the lead bank share. We present the regression results in models (1) and (2) in Panel A of
Table 4. Our main finding is robust to the inclusion of lead bank fixed effects.17
In models (3) and (4) of Panel A of Table 4, we report the results using the PE firm fixed
effects models. It is possible that some consistently good quality PE firms tend to have a stronger
relationship with a particular bank (because the bank is willing to work closely with a good PE
firm) and a good quality PE firm has a higher likelihood of being the backer of a sound IPO
company. Hence, the association between PE-bank relationship and lead bank share we have
discovered could merely reflect the unobservable PE firm quality. Using the PE sponsor fixed
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The sample used in the regressions with lead-bank fixed effects has 287 observations, four observations less than
the 291 observations in the early regressions. We use the average share of lead banks as the dependent variable when
there are multiple lead banks in a facility in previous analysis. This presents a problem in the lead bank fixed effect
model since we cannot determine which lead bank’s fixed effect to include. Thus, we only use the 287 loans with
exactly one lead bank.
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effects model, we are estimating the effect of within-PE variation in the relationship variable on
the lead bank share, while controlling for time-invariant (both observable and unobservable) PE
firm quality. The results after controlling for PE sponsor fixed effects, regardless of the model
specifications, are in line with our previous results.18
An endogeneity problem could also arise from the selection process of an IPO companybank pair. Although a PE firm is not necessarily in charge of choosing the lender for a portfolio
company after the IPO, it could still propose its relationship bank(s) to its IPO companies. A PE
firm could be inclined to recommend a relationship bank to an IPO company with publicly
unobservable but better credit qualities that requires less efforts for due diligence and monitoring,
resulting in a negative relation between our PE-bank relationship measure and the lead bank share.
In this case, the strength of PE-bank relationships would relate to the unobservable qualities of the
IPO company. 19 We use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to deal with this endogeneity
problem. The IV that we use is the highest bank relationship that a PE firm has immediately prior
to the loan inception. This highest bank relationship value captures a PE firm’s propensity to use
a relationship bank again in the current deal, but it is unrelated to the IPO company’s characteristics
because it is pre-determined.20
We present the two stage least square (2SLS) regression results in Panel B of Table 4. In
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In unreported tests, we also include both lead bank and PE sponsor fixed effects. We find that the coefficient on the
PE-Bank Relationship ($) remains negative but becomes statistically insignificant. Since we only have 291
observations, the inclusion of both fixed effects substantially consumes the statistical power of these tests.
19
In unreported results, we estimate IPO firm fixed effects models. Although the coefficient estimates on the PE-Bank
relationship ($) are still negative, they are not statistically significant. This is likely due to the fact that few IPO
companies have multiple loans in our sample. One could also argue that PE firms could bring more challenging deals
to their relationship banks. Since more challenging deals would require the lead banks to retain a greater loan share,
this argument suggests a positive effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share. This positive effect biases
against our findings, so this argument is not a concern for us. We also want to point out that the selection bias that we
try to deal with using IVs can be weak, as a PE firm may not have a strong reason to bring a borrowing company with
either a good quality or a more challenging deal to a certain relationship bank.
20
In an unreported test, we obtain very similar results if we use the highest PE-bank relationship measured six months
or one year prior to the loan inception.
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models (1) and (3), we report the first stage regressions under the basic and expanded model
specifications, respectively. In these first-stage regressions, the Highest Bank Relationship ($) is
positively related to the dependent variable, PE-Bank Relationship ($). This is consistent with our
conjecture that a PE firm that has traditionally relied on one or more relationship banks is more
likely to choose a relationship bank in a subsequent deal. In models (2) and (4), we report the
respective second stage regression results. The effect of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) on the lead
bank’s share remains negative and statistically significant at the one or five percent levels,
suggesting that potential endogeneity related to the selection of banks is not responsible for our
early regression results in Tables 2 and 3. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test statistic rejects the null
hypothesis of weak instrument.
4.4 Cross-sectional heterogeneity of PE-bank relationship effects
Our efficient information production hypothesis suggests that PE-bank relationships would
be more useful for less transparent companies, which require greater due diligence and monitoring
costs. We shed further light on how the effect of PE-bank relationships on syndicate structure
varies depending upon the borrowing company’s informational opaqueness.
In Table 5, we consider three widely used proxies for information opaqueness of a
borrowing company. The first proxy is average total asset size in the previous two years. A larger
company has a relatively lower degree of information asymmetry. We partition our sample using
the sample median of the average total assets and re-estimate the regressions for the two
subsamples separately. In Panel A, it is clear that the effect of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) on the
lead bank share is much stronger among smaller IPO companies. For smaller IPO companies that
require more costly information production, having their PE sponsors connected with the lead
banks significantly reduces the loan shares that the lead banks need to hold.

21

The other two proxies for ex ante information asymmetry are constructed according to an
IPO company’s research analyst coverage. We obtain analyst coverage data from the Thomas
Reuters I/B/E/S database and calculate the standard deviations of analyst recommendations and
analyst earnings-per-share (EPS) fiscal year 1 (FY1) forecasts for the year prior to the loan
inception. We use analyst recommendations and EPS forecasts that were issued before a loan
inception date and are still valid by the time of the loan inception. A more opaque company should
be associated with a greater dispersion in analyst recommendations or EPS forecasts. In Panel B
and Panel C, we show that the effect of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) on the lead bank share is
much more pronounced among companies for which the dispersion in analyst recommendations
or the dispersion in EPS forecast is greater. These results again imply that the PE-bank relationship
is a particularly important channel of information transmission among more informationally
opaque companies.
4.5 Syndicate size, foreign bank participation, and syndication speed
So far, our results on the effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share support
our efficient information production hypothesis. We then examine the effect of PE-bank
relationships on some related syndicate characteristics, controlling for the effects of other variables.
Table 6 reports the results. Our discussions below focus on the effect of PE-bank relationships.
First, we examine syndicate size as an alternative measure of syndicate concentration.
Panel A in Table 6 reports the estimation results. The dependent variable is the total number of
lenders of a loan facility. Because this variable is a count number, we estimate Poisson
regressions.21 In column (1) of Panel A, we estimate the baseline model. The coefficient on the
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We retain loans which have only one lead bank. We also winsorize the total number of lenders at 10 (i.e., for loans
with more than 10 lenders, we set the total number of lenders to 10).
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PE-Bank Relationship ($) is positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level.
Economically, a one-standard-deviation increase in this variable (0.23) increases the total number
of lenders by 0.38 (0.23×0.32×5.14 = 0.38). In column (2) of Panel A, where an expanded model
with additional control variables is estimated, the coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($)
remains positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level. These results suggest that a
stronger PE-bank relationship is associated with a greater number of participant lenders, providing
further support for the efficient information production hypothesis.
Next, we explore the effect of PE-bank relationships on loan syndicate composition to offer
additional insight into how PE-bank relationships mitigate information asymmetry-related issues.
We focus on one feature of syndicate composition – the participation of foreign lenders in a
syndicate. Because foreign banks are geographically farther away, they are presumably more
sensitive to asymmetric information issues when they participate in syndicated lending to U.S.
borrowers (Stein, 2002; Esty, 2004; Sufi, 2007; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2012). Thus, we
conjecture that a strong PE-bank relationship is associated with a greater chance of having one or
more foreign lenders in the syndicate as it helps alleviate information asymmetries between the
borrower and its lenders. We estimate a Logit model to assess the effect of PE-lead bank
relationships on the probability of having a foreign participant lender.22
We present the regression results in Panel B of Table 6. For the baseline model in column
(3), the coefficient on the variable PE-Bank Relationship ($) is positive and statistically significant
at the ten percent level. Economically, if we change the actual value of this variable for each
observation from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above its actual value,
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Among the 291 facilities to PE-backed IPO companies, about 37.1% of them have one or more foreign lender
presence. A foreign lender is present for approximately 19.6% of the full sample of the 1,627 facilities to both PEbacked and non-PE backed IPO companies.
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without changing the actual values of other independent variables, the predicted average likelihood
of foreign lender participation increases by about 30.3% (e.g., from 10% to 40.3%). In column (4)
with additional controls, the coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) remains positive and
becomes statistically significant at the one percent level. These findings indicate that a stronger
PE-bank relationship significantly increases the odds of having a foreign lender in the syndicate,
again consistent with the notion that PE-bank relationships mitigate information asymmetryrelated issues in lending.23
Finally, we study the speed of the loan syndication process to provide additional evidence
on the effect of a PE-bank relationship. Ivashina and Sun (2011) suggest that time-on-the-market
(TOM), which is defined as the number of days from the start of syndication to the completion of
a loan, captures the demand for the loan. We conjecture that, if other potential lenders acknowledge
that the lead bank’s relationship with the PE firm lowers the cost of information production and
monitoring and, as a result, the lead bank’s moral hazard issue is of less concerns, they will bid
more aggressively for the loan and the overall loan demand would be greater. Thus, all else being
equal, a stronger PE-bank relationship will be related to a shorter TOM for the loan.
In Panel C of Table 6, we regress TOM on PE-Bank Relationship ($) along with the control
variables. Because the number of days is an integer count number greater than zero, we again
estimate Poisson regressions. Also, due to the fact that a large portion of time-on-the-market
information is missing in DealScan, we do not require a loan to have non-missing lead bank share
to include it in this sample. We also include the loans to non-PE backed IPO companies to ensure
that we have a reasonable sample size. To control for the difference between the PE-backed and
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In untabulated analysis of the sample of 824 loans to PE-backed IPO companies without requiring lead lender share
information, we also find evidence that a stronger PE-bank relationship is associated with a larger syndicate size and
a higher likelihood of foreign bank participation in the syndicate.
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non-PE backed loans, we add a dummy control variable, PE Sponsor Dummy, to indicate whether
a loan is to a PE-backed IPO company (=1) or not (=0). For the loans to non-PE backed IPO
companies, their PE-bank relationships are set to zero. From the regression results in Panel C of
Table 6, we can see that a stronger PE-bank relationship does lead to a shorter syndication process.
The coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is negative and statistically significant at the ten
and five percent levels in column (5) and column (6), respectively. Economically, a one-standarddeviation increase in this variable decreases loan syndication time by over 10% or 3.21 days
(0.23×(-0.45)×31.05=-3.21) in column (5). The fact that a stronger PE-bank relationship results in
a shorter loan syndication time adds further support to our efficient information production
hypothesis.
4.6 PE-bank relationship and lead bank share: More robustness checks
We present an array of additional robustness checks in Table 7. To save space, we only
report the results using the expanded OLS specification. Using the baseline model specification
yields very similar results.
We first investigate whether the negative effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank
share is caused by the joint lending and underwriting relationships between the borrower and the
lead bank. A company can use the same bank for both borrowing and underwriting (see, e.g.,
Drucker and Puri, 2005; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2007). To rule out the
possibility that this underwriting channel is the main driver for our early results, we check whether
the lead bank was also a lead underwriter of the borrowing company’s IPO for each of the 291
loans to PE-backed companies. There are 38 loans that have overlapping lead banks/underwriters.
We include a dummy variable, Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy, in our
expanded regression for the sample of loans to PE-backed IPO companies as a control variable.
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The Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy variable equals one if the lead bank of the
current loan was the lead or one of the lead underwriters of the borrowing company’s IPO, and it
is set to zero otherwise. We report the regression results in Panel A of Table 7. The coefficient on
the Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy variable is not statistically significant. The
coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is virtually the same as in Table 3. These results
suggest that the underwriting channel cannot explain our earlier results.
It is possible that PE firms also have relationships with participant lenders. These
relationships could also alleviate information asymmetry problems in lending (Sufi, 2007). In
Panel B of Table 7, we check to see whether these relationships drive our earlier results on the PE
sponsor’s relationships with the lead bank. For each participant lender in a loan, we compute a
similar measure for its relationships with the PE sponsor as the ratio of the dollar amount of loans
from this particular bank to this PE firm’s portfolio companies over the dollar amount of all loans
to the PE firm’s portfolio companies during the past five years. We set the PE-Participant
Relationship ($) to the maximum relationship measure for all participant lenders in the loan, and
set it to zero for sole lender loans. The effect of the PE firm’s relationships on the lead bank share
is qualitatively similar whether we control for the PE firm’s relationships with the participant
banks or not.24
In Panel C of Table 7, we show that the effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank
share is robust to the usage of a Tobit model that deals with a censored dependent variable.25 In
Panel D of Table 7, we present the package level results. We regress the package level bank share
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A large PE firm can have relationships with many banks and such relationships make the participation of these
banks in the syndicate more likely. We control for the reputation of the PE firm in our expanded regressions, although
it has little effect on syndicate structure measures. More importantly, such network of relationships does not explain
why the relationships between the lead bank and the PE sponsor reduce the lead bank share.
25
The original dependent variable, Lead Bank Share, has a lower limit of 0 and an upper limit of 1. Although it is
unlikely that any artificial censoring is involved, we still make sure that our results are robust.
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on a PE-bank relationship measure and the control variables. The 291 facilities made to PE-backed
IPO companies correspond to 187 packages. From Panel D of Table 7, we can see that the package
level estimation results are, qualitatively and quantitatively, similar to the facility level results.26
In Panels E and F of Table 7, we that our finding remains intact if we focus on revolving credit
lines and term loans separately.
Additionally, we examine the effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share for a
subsample of leveraged facilities.27 If a strong PE-bank relationship lessens the participant banks’
concern about the lead bank’s moral hazard problem, we expect this effect to be more pronounced
among leveraged facilities since riskier borrowers require more intensive screening and monitoring.
Compared with the previous estimation results using all loan facilities, the estimated coefficients
on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) for the leveraged subsample remain negative and increase in their
economic and statistical significance. Also, our initial measure for a PE firm’s reputation is the
total dollar amount of loans sponsored by the PE firm in the past five years. This measure could
be subject to fluctuations in the volume of the LBO market across time. To remove the time-series
effect, we scale the initial measure by the total amount of sponsored loans by all PE firms in the
past five years. Our major results remain essentially the same. The results using the Herfindahl
Index as the dependent variable are also robust. Some PE firms have direct affiliations with banks
(Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner, 2013). Our major results are essentially the same whether or not we
control for PE-lead bank affiliations. For brevity, these results are not tabulated but are available
upon request.
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Our facility level regressions correct the standard errors for clustering at the borrower level. Our major facility level
results are essentially the same if we correct the standard errors for clustering at the package level instead.
27
We consider a loan facility to be leveraged if, in the DealScan database, its market segment is marked as either
“Leveraged”, “Highly Leveraged”, or “Non-investment Grade”.
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4.7 PE-bank relationship and lead bank share: Larger sample results
In Table 8, we examine whether our main results on the lead lender share still hold in a
broader sample that includes non-PE backed IPO companies. We include the same control
variables as in Table 2 (for the baseline model in the first two columns) or Table 3 (for the
expanded model in the last two columns). For brevity, the coefficients on the control variables are
not reported.
In column (1) of Table 8, we examine the effect of the PE firm’s IPO sponsorship on the
lead bank share, regardless of the strength of PE-bank relationships. The PE Sponsor Dummy is
set to one if the borrowing company’s IPO is backed by a PE firm, and zero otherwise. The
coefficient on the PE Sponsor Dummy is -0.10 and is statistically significant at the one percent
level, suggesting that having PE sponsorship at the IPO on average reduces the lead bank’s share
of a post-IPO loan facility by 10% (e.g., from 61% to 51%). In column (2) of Table 8, we create
two dummy variables to represent strong and weak PE-bank relationships. The Strong Relationship
Dummy ($) equals one if the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is greater than or equal to 21%, and zero
otherwise. The Weak Relationship Dummy ($) equals one if the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is less
than 21% for loans to PE-backed companies, and is set to zero if the loan is to a non-PE-backed
company or the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is greater than or equal to 21%. The regression uses the
loans to non-PE-backed IPOs as the reference group. We choose as the cutoff point the mean value
(21%) of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) for all of the 824 loans by the PE-sponsored companies in
the sample of 2,920 loan facilities for which lead banks can be identified (some of these loans do
not have lead bank share information). We use these dummy variables to alleviate the effect of
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potential nonlinearity associated with the continuous PE-bank relationship measure that is more of
a concern when both PE-backed and non-PE-backed IPO companies are included in the sample.28
As reported in column (2) of Table 8, the coefficient on the Strong Relationship Dummy
($) is -0.21 and is statistically significant at the one percent level. This result suggests that,
compared with those to other IPO companies, the lead banks of the loans to PE-backed IPO
companies hold 21% less (e.g., from 72% to 51%) when the lead banks have a strong relationship
with the PE sponsors. On the other hand, the Weak Relationship Dummy ($) has a coefficient of 0.08, which is statistically significant at the five percent level. It means that a moderate relationship
between the PE sponsor and the lead bank can still reduce the lead bank share, yet by a much
smaller amount.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 8, we include additional control variables such as the Lead
Lender Reputation, New Lender Dummy, PE Firm Reputation, and loan characteristics. In model
(3), the coefficient on the PE Sponsor Dummy is still negative but becomes statistically
insignificant. Nevertheless, in model (4), the coefficient on the Strong Relationship Dummy ($) is
negative and statistically significant at the ten percent level.29
5. Conclusions
Private equity (PE) firms are an important player in the economy. They have significant
equity stakes in many companies, and interact frequently and develop relationships with banks.
Using a sample of bank loans to IPO companies, we find that a stronger PE-lead bank relationship
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We also use the continuous measure PE-Bank Relationship ($), together with the PE dummy, for the larger
sample of both PE- and non-PE-sponsored IPOs. The coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is negative but
only statistically significant at the ten percent level. We set the PE-Bank Relationship ($) to zero for all non-PEsponsored IPOs. The decrease in statistical significance suggests that the PE-bank relationship has a nonlinear effect
on the lead bank share.
29
In the un-tabulated analysis of syndicate size and foreign lender participation using the sample of 2,920 loans
without requiring leader lender share information, we also find that a stronger PE-bank relationship is associated with
a larger syndicate size and a higher likelihood of foreign bank participation in the syndicate.
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allows the lead bank to hold a significantly smaller fraction of a loan to a PE-sponsored company
and form a significantly larger and less concentrated syndicate. The likelihood of foreign bank
participation in a syndicate also increases with the strength of a PE-bank relationship. These
findings are robust to different measures of PE-bank relationship and to the control of the lead
bank reputation, the PE sponsor reputation, the lead bank- and PE- fixed effects, the lead bank’s
underwriting relationships with the borrower, and the PE sponsor’s relationships with the
participant lenders. PE-bank relationships are also more important for more informationally
opaque borrowers. These findings provide strong support for our efficient information production
hypothesis that PE-bank relationships facilitate efficient information production and mitigate
information asymmetry-related problems in lending.
The literature on relationship banking focuses on the direct bilateral relationship between
the borrower and the lender (e.g., Boot, 2000; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2007,
2011). We contribute to the literature by showing that a close past lending relationship between a
borrower’s lead bank and a third-party financial sponsor also facilitates the lead bank’s information
acquisition about the borrower. The enhanced efficiency in information production helps banks to
expand lending in the syndicated loans market as they can provide less capital for loans that they
arrange. Borrowing companies also benefit from such bank-third party relationships as they gain
better access to credit.

30

References
Bates, Thomas W., K.M. Kahle and R.M. Stulz, 2009. Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash
than they used to? Journal of Finance 64, 1985-2021.
Berger, Allen N. and G. Udell, 1995. Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm finance,
Journal of Business 68, 351-81.
Bharath, Sreedhar T., S. Dahiya, A. Saunders and A. Srinivasan, 2007. So what do I get? The
bank's view of lending relationships, Journal of Financial Economics 85, 368-419.
Bharath, Sreedhar T., S. Dahiya, A. Saunders and A. Srinivasan, 2011. Lending relationships and
loan contract terms, Review of Financial Studies 24, 1141-1203.
Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of Financial
Intermediation 9, 7-25.
Bouwman, Christa and M. Lowry, 2012. Cash holdings and the effects of pre-IPO financing in
newly public firms. Working paper, Texas A&M and Drexel University.
Cao, Jerry and J. Lerner, 2009. The performance of reverse leveraged buyouts, Journal of
Financial Economics 91, 139-157.
Cerqueiro, Geraldo, S. Ongena and K. Roszbach, 2016. Collateralization, bank loan rates, and
monitoring, Journal of Finance 71, 1295-1322.
Chava, Sudheer and M.R. Roberts, 2008. How does financing impact investment? The role of debt
covenants, Journal of Finance 63, 2085-2121.
Chemmanur, Thomas J. and P. Fulghieri, 1994. Investment bank reputation, information
production, and financial intermediation, Journal of Finance 49, 57-79.
Chu, Yongqiang, D. Zhang and Y. Zhao, 2017. Bank capital and lending: Evidence from
syndicated loans. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming.
Demiroglu, Cem and C.M. James, 2010. The role of private equity group reputation in LBO
financing, Journal of Financial Economics 96, 306-330.
Diamond, Douglas W., 1984. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring, Review of
Economic Studies 51, 393-414.
Diamond, Douglas W., 1989. Reputation acquisition in debt markets, Journal of Political Economy
97, 828-862.
Drucker, Steven and M. Puri, 2005. On the benefits of concurrent lending and underwriting,
Journal of Finance 60, 2763-2799.
Drucker, Steven and M. Puri, 2009. On loan sales, loan contracting, and lending relationships,
Review of Financial Studies 22, 2835-2872.

31

Esty, Benjamin, 2001. Structuring loan syndicates: A case study of the Hong Kong Disneyland
project loan, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 13, 3-23.
Esty, Benjamin, 2004. When do foreign banks finance domestic projects? New evidence on the
importance of legal and financial systems. Mimeo, Harvard Business School.
Fang, Lily, V. Ivashina and J. Lerner, 2013. Combining banking with private equity investing,
Review of Financial Studies 26, 2139-2273.
Gompers, Paul, S.N. Kaplan and V. Mukharlyamov, 2015. What do private equity firms say they
do? Working paper, Harvard University and University of Chicago.
Gopalan, Radhakrishnan, V. Nanda and V. Yerramilli, 2011. Does poor performance damage the
reputation of financial intermediaries? Evidence from the loan syndication market, Journal of
Finance 66, 2083-2120.
Gorton, Gary B. and G.G. Pennacchi, 1995. Banks and loan sales: Marketing nonmarketable assets,
Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 389-411.
Guo, Shourun, E.S. Hotchkiss and W. Song, 2011. Do buyouts (still) create value? Journal of
Finance 66, 479-517.
Harris, Milton and A. Raviv, 1979, Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information,
Journal of Economic Theory 20, 231-259.
Hauswald, Robert and R. Marquez, 2006. Competition and strategic information acquisition in
credit markets, Review of Financial Studies 19, 967-1000.
Helwege, Jean and N. Liang, 1996. Is there a pecking order? Evidence from a panel of IPO firms,
Journal of Financial Economics 40, 429-458.
Hertzel, Michael G., M.R. Huson and R. Parrino, 2012. Public market staging: The timing of
capital infusions in newly public firms, Journal of Financial Economics 106, 72-90.
Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. Moral hazard and observability, Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74-91.
Holmstrom, Bengt and J. Tirole, 1997. Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663-691.
Huang, Rongbing, J.R. Ritter and D. Zhang, 2016. Private equity firms’ reputational concerns and
the costs of debt financing, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51, 29-54.
Ivashina, Victoria, 2009. Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads, Journal of Financial
Economics 92, 300-319.
Ivashina, Victoria and Z. Sun, 2011. Institutional demand pressure and the cost of corporate loans,
Journal of Financial Economics 99, 500-522.
Ivashina, Victoria and A. Kovner, 2011. The private equity advantage: Leveraged buyout firms
and relationship banking, Review of Financial Studies 24, 2462-2498.

32

Jensen, Michael, 1986. Agency costs of free cash flows, corporate finance and takeovers,
American Economic Review 76, 323-339.
Kaplan, Steven N., 1989. The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value,
Journal of Financial Economics 24, 217-254.
Kaplan, Steven N., B.A. Sensoy and P. Strömberg, 2009. Should investors bet on the jockey or the
horse? Evidence from the evolution of firms from early business plans to public companies,
Journal of Finance 64, 75-115.
Lin, Chen, Y. Ma, P. Malatesta and Y. Xuan, 2012. Corporate ownership structure and bank loan
syndicate structure, Journal of Financial Economics 104, 1-22.
Loughran, Tim and J.R. Ritter, 2004. Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? Financial
Management 33, 5-37.
Malenko, Andrey and N. Malenko, 2015. A theory of LBO activity based on repeated debt-equity
conflicts, Journal of Financial Economics 117, 607-627.
Ongena, Steven and D. Smith, 2000. Bank relationships: A review, in Patrick Harker and Stavros
Zenios, eds.: The Performance of Financial Institutions: Efficiency, Innovation, and Regulation.
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York).
Petersen, Mitchell A. and R.G. Rajan, 1994. The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from
small business data, Journal of Finance 49, 3-37.
Rajan, Raghuram G., 1992. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm's length
debt, Journal of Finance 47, 1367-1400.
Rajan, Raghuram G. and A. Winton, 1995. Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor,
Journal of Finance 50, 1113-1146.
S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2016. A syndicated loan primer.
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/2016 US Loan Primer.pdf.
Saunders, Anthony and S. Steffen, 2011. The costs of being private: Evidence from the loan market,
Review of Financial Studies 24: 4091-4122.
Schenone, Carola, 2010. Lending relationships and information rents: Do banks exploit their
information advantages? Review of Financial Studies 23, 1149-1199.
Sharpe, Steven A., 1990. Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: A stylized
model of customer relationships, Journal of Finance 45, 1069-1087.
Smith, Clifford and J. Warner, 1979. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants,
Journal of Financial Economics 7, 117-161.
Shleifer, Andrei and L. Summers, 1988. Breach of trust in hostile takeovers, in Alan J. Auerbach,
ed. Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
33

Stein, Jeremy, 2002. Information production and capital allocation: Decentralized versus
hierarchical firms, Journal of Finance 57, 1891-1922.
Sufi, Amir, 2007. Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated
loans, Journal of Finance 62, 629-668.
Warga, Arthur and I. Welch, 1993. Bondholder losses in leveraged buyouts, Review of Financial
Studies 6, 959-982.

34

Appendix A1
Variable definitions
This appendix contains the detailed variable definitions. For some of the variables in this appendix, their
natural logarithms are used in the regressions. Ln(X) denotes the natural logarithm of variable X.
Variable Name
No. of All (Participant) Lenders
Lead Bank Share

Herfindahl Index
Foreign Bank Dummy
Time-on-the-Market (TOM)
PE-Bank Relationship ($)

Strong Relationship Dummy ($)
Weak Relationship Dummy ($)

PE-Bank Relationship (#)

PE-Participant Relationship ($)

Highest Bank Relationship ($)
All-In-Spread Drawn (bps)

Loan Amount ($m)
Maturity

Detailed Definition
The total number of all lenders (participant lenders, excluding lead) in the
syndicate of the loan facility.
The lead lender’s share of the dollar amount of the loan facility. If the syndicate
has more than one lead lender, this is the average share of the lead lenders. To
increase the number of usable observations, we set the Lead Bank Share to
100% if No. of All Lenders equals one.
The Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in the loan facility, computed as the sum
of the squares of each lender’s share in the loan.
A dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility has a non-U.S. bank as a
participant bank according to DealScan, and equals zero otherwise.
Number of days from the start of the syndication to the completion of the loan
For a loan to a PE-backed company, the dollar-based relationship measure is
defined as the ratio of the total dollar amount of loans sponsored by the PE firm
and from the lead bank of the current loan facility in the past five years scaled by
the total dollar amount of loans sponsored by the same PE firm in the past five
years (regardless of lead banks). This measure is set zero for all loans to non-PEbacked companies.
This dummy variable equals one if PE-Bank Relationship ($) is greater than or
equal to 21%, and zero otherwise.
For a loan to a PE-backed company, this dummy variable equals one if PE-Bank
Relationship ($) is less than 21%, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable is set
zero for loans to non-PE-backed companies.
This continuous relationship measure is defined in the same way as PE-Bank
Relationship ($) except that the number of loans instead of the loan amount is
used in calculating the ratio.
For a participant bank in a loan, we first compute a measure for the participant
bank’s relationship with the PE firm as the ratio of the total dollar amount of
loans with this participant bank as the lead bank and with the PE firm as a
sponsor in the past five years scaled by the total dollar amount of loans with the
same PE firm as a sponsor in the past five years (regardless of lead banks). PEParticipant Relationship ($) equals the maximum relationship measure for all
participant lenders in the loan, and equals zero for sole lender loans.
The highest value of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) for the PE sponsor of the
borrowing IPO company with any banks prior to the current loan
The spread the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn
down. It adds the yield spread of the loan with any annual (or facility) fee paid
to the bank group.
The actual amount of the loan facility committed by the facility’s lender pool, in
millions of dollars of the 2011 purchasing power.
The number of months the facility will be active from the start date to the
expiration date.
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Appendix A1: Continued.
Variable Name
Secured Loan Dummy
Performance Pricing Dummy

No. of Fin. Covenants

No. of Non-Fin. Covenants

Loan Type Dummies

Deal Purpose Dummies

PE Sponsor Dummy
Lead Lender Reputation

New Lender Dummy

PE Firm Reputation
Market Cap. ($m)

Market-to-Book

Dividend Payer Dummy

Borrower Age

Detailed Definition
A dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility is secured, and equals zero
otherwise.
A dummy variable that equals one if there is a grid displaying different pricing
levels based on a predefined trigger such as a company’s ratings and ratios, and
equals zero otherwise.
The total number of covenants based on financial ratios (see Appendix A2). We
first create a dummy variable that equals one if a financial ratio covenant exists,
and equals zero otherwise. To avoid losing too many observations, we set the
dummy variable to zero if there is no covenant based on a financial ratio or
information about it is missing. We add up the dummy variables to obtain the
number of financial covenants.
The total number of non-financial covenants (see Appendix A2). This variable is
constructed in the same way as No. of Fin. Covenants based on non-financial
ratio covenants.
Including (1) 364-Day Dummy, (2) Revolver (<1 Year) Dummy, (3) Revolver
(≥1 Year) Dummy, (4) Term Loan Dummy, (5) Term Loan A Dummy, and (6)
Term Loan B-G Dummy. The omitted group includes all other much less
common loan types (e.g. “Bridge Loan”, “Delay Draw Term Loan”, “Note”,
“Other Loan”, “Revolver/Term Loan”, and “Standby Letter of Credit”, among
others). The group definition follows Drucker and Puri (2009).
Including (1) Acquire Dummy, (2) General Dummy, (3) LBO Dummy, and (4)
Recap Dummy. The omitted group includes “Miscellaneous” and “Other”
purposes. The group definition follows Drucker and Puri (2009).
A dummy variable that equals one if the borrower was a PE-backed company at
the IPO, and equals zero otherwise.
Measured by the lead lender market share, which is the total amount of all loans
for which the lead lender of the current loan was also a lead lender divided by
the total amount of loans in the DealScan universe during the five years prior to
the current loan’s start date. If there are multiple lead lenders for the current
loan, the maximum lender market share is used.
A dummy variable that equals one if none of the lead lenders is a lead lender in
the loans by the same borrower during the five years prior to the current loan’s
start date, and equals zero otherwise.
Ln(1+ the total amount of borrowing sponsored by the PE firm over the past five
years, in millions of dollars of the 2011 purchasing power).
Market capitalization (Compustat items CSHO × TEM PRCC_F) of the
borrower at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date, in
millions of dollars of the 2011 purchasing power.
The sum of the market value of equity (items CSHO × PRCC_F) and the book
value of debt (items LT + PSTKL – TXDITC) divided by the book value of total
assets (item AT) at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date. If
item PSTKL is missing, it is replaced with item PSTKRV. If PSTKRV is also
missing, it is replaced with PSTK. If it is still missing, it is set to zero.
A dummy variable that equals one if the company paid a dividend (item
DVC>0) during the fiscal year immediately prior to the loan start date, and
equals zero otherwise.
The number of years from the borrower’s founding date to the loan start date.
The founding date of a RLBO firm is the founding date of its predecessor
company and is taken from the Field-Ritter data set available on Jay Ritter’s
website (Loughran and Ritter, 2004).
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Appendix A1: Continued.
Variable Name
Leverage

Tangibility
Profitability

Operating Loss Dummy
Beta

Stock Return Volatility

Industry Dummies
Term Spread (%)
Default Spread (%)
Year Dummies

Detailed Definition
The book value of debt (total liabilities + minority interest – deferred taxes and
investment tax credit + liquidating value of preferred stock – convertible debt, or
Compustat items LT+MTB-TXDITC+PSTKL-DCVT) divided by total assets
(item AT) at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date.
Convertible debt (DCVT) is set to zero if it is missing in Compustat.
The fraction of net property, plant, and equipment in the total assets (items
PPENT/AT) at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date.
The net income (Compustat item NI) of the borrower during the fiscal year
immediately prior to the loan start date divided by its book value of total assets
(AT) at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date.
A dummy variable that equals one if item NI is negative during the fiscal year
immediately prior to the loan start date, and equals zero otherwise.
The beta coefficient from the market model using the equal-weighted CRSP
market index and daily close-to-close percentage returns over the 200 trading
days ending 11 days prior to the loan start date.
The standard error of residuals from the market model using the equal-weighted
CRSP market index and daily close-to-close percentage returns over the 200
trading days ending 11 days prior to the loan start date.
Dummy variables using Ken French’s 17 industry classification at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
The daily percentage yield difference between ten- and one-year constant fixed
maturity treasuries at http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/data/us/.
The daily percentage yield difference between Moody’s Baa and Aaa rated
corporate bonds at http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/data/us/.
Dummy variables for the years from 1995-2011.

Appendix A2
List of bank loan covenants
Financial covenants:
Max. Capex, Max. Debt to EBITDA, Max. Debt to Equity, Max. Debt to Tangible Net Worth, Max.
Leverage Ratio, Max. Loan to Value, Max. Long-Term Investment to Net Worth, Max. Net Debt to Assets,
Max. Senior Debt to EBITDA, Max. Senior Leverage, Max. Total Debt (including Contingent Liabilities)
to Tangible Net Worth, Min. Cash Interest Coverage, Min. Current Ratio, Min. Debt Service Coverage,
Min. EBITDA, Min. Equity to Asset Ratio, Min. Fixed Charge Coverage, Min. Interest Coverage, Min. Net
Worth to Total Asset, Min. Quick Ratio, Other Ratio, Net Worth, Tangible Net Worth.
Non-financial covenants:
Insurance Proceeds Sweep, Dividend Restriction, Equity Issuance Sweep, Debt Issuance Sweep, Asset
Sales Sweep, Excess Cash Flow Sweep, Percentage of Net Income, Percentage of Excess Cash Flow.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
This table reports the mean, median, and standard deviation (std.) of the variables for the sample of 1,627 loan facilities.
We also report the summary statistics separately for the 291 facilities to PE-backed IPO companies and the 1,336
facilities to non-PE-backed IPO companies. The sample period is 1995-2011. See Appendix A1 for variable
definitions. Ln(X) denotes the natural logarithm of variable X.
Full
Loans to PE-backed
Loans to non-PE-backed
sample (1,627)
IPO companies (291)
IPO companies (1,336)
Mean Median
Std.
Mean Median
Std.
Mean Median
Std.
Loan characteristics
Lead Bank Share
0.73
1.00
0.36
0.51
0.33
0.39
0.78
1.00
0.34
Herfindahl Index
0.71
1.00
0.38
0.48
0.26
0.41
0.76
1.00
0.36
All-In Spread Drawn (bps)
241.20 225.00
127.39
229.85 200.00
147.2
243.67 250.00 122.57
No. of All Lenders
4.07
1.00
6.74
7.54
5.00
8.46
3.31
1.00
6.05
No. of Participant Lenders
3.04
0.00
6.73
6.52
4.00
8.46
2.29
0.00
6.03
Foreign Bank Dummy
0.20
0.00
0.40
0.37
0.00
0.48
0.16
0.00
0.36
Loan Amount ($m)
126.09 31.75
298.51
215.81 99.28 334.78
106.55 27.00 286.44
Ln (Loan Amount ($m))
3.55
3.46
1.65
4.53
4.60
1.40
3.33
3.30
1.63
Maturity (months)
37.89 36.00
23.18
48.88 59.00
22.03
35.49 36.00
22.73
Ln (Maturity)
3.40
3.58
0.76
3.74
4.08
0.63
3.33
3.58
0.76
No. of Fin. Covenants
2.43
3.00
1.50
2.55
3.00
1.33
2.41
2.50
1.53
No. of Non-Fin. Covenants
2.46
1.00
2.40
3.23
3.00
2.31
2.29
1.00
2.39
Performance Pricing Dummy
0.47
0.00
0.50
0.66
1.00
0.47
0.43
0.00
0.49
Secured Loan Dummy
0.86
1.00
0.34
0.89
1.00
0.31
0.86
1.00
0.35
PE-Bank Relationship ($)
0.02
0.00
0.11
0.13
0.00
0.23
0.00
0.00
0.00
PE-Bank Relationship (#)
0.03
0.00
0.11
0.15
0.03
0.24
0.00
0.00
0.00
Lead Lender Reputation
0.09
0.03
0.11
0.12
0.08
0.12
0.08
0.03
0.11
New Lender Dummy
0.56
1.00
0.50
0.40
0.00
0.49
0.60
1.00
0.49
PE Firm Reputation
1.25
0.00
3.12
7.00
8.43
3.76
0.00
0.00
0.00
Borrower characteristics
Market Cap. ($m)
Ln (Market Cap. ($m))
Borrower Age (years)
Ln (1+Borrower Age)
Leverage
Tangibility
Dividend Payer Dummy
Market-to-Book
Profitability
Operating Loss Dummy
Beta
Stock Return Volatility
Term Spread (%)
Default Spread (%)

1,319.97 231.90
5.52
5.45
18.26 11.00
2.57
2.48
0.47
0.43
0.25
0.16
0.14
0.00
2.44
1.83
-0.09
0.02
0.40
0.00
1.35
1.24
0.05
0.04
1.00
0.70
0.86
0.78

6,333.75
1.63
20.94
0.83
0.30
0.23
0.35
2.56
0.41
0.49
0.91
0.03
1.02
0.34
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1,052.62 485.37 1,866.02
6.07
6.18
1.48
22.14 15.00
21.56
2.78
2.77
0.86
0.60
0.57
0.39
0.34
0.29
0.26
0.15
0.00
0.36
1.91
1.51
1.15
-0.02
0.04
0.32
0.30
0.00
0.46
1.18
1.18
0.68
0.04
0.03
0.02
1.32
0.91
1.15
0.95
0.86
0.38

1,378.20 203.05 6,934.37
5.40
5.31
1.64
17.41 10.00
20.71
2.53
2.40
0.82
0.44
0.40
0.27
0.23
0.14
0.22
0.14
0.00
0.34
2.56
1.94
2.76
-0.10
0.02
0.42
0.42
0.00
0.49
1.38
1.26
0.95
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.93
0.65
0.98
0.84
0.76
0.33

Table 2
PE-bank relationship and syndicate structure: Baseline regressions
This table reports the baseline OLS regression results using the lead bank share per facility (Panel A) and facility
Herfindahl Index (Panel B) as dependent variables. The regressions in this table use the sample of only the 291 loans
to PE-backed IPO companies. All models control for year, industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy
variables, but their coefficients and t-statistics are omitted below. See Appendix A1 for variable definitions. Ln(X)
denotes the natural logarithm of variable X. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are
calculated using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.
Panel A: Lead bank share
Panel B: Herfindahl index
Name of variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
PE-Bank Relationship ($)

-0.28***
(-3.36)

-0.28***
(-3.18)

PE-Bank Relationship (#)
Market-to-Book
Ln (Market Cap. ($m))
Dividend Payer Dummy
Leverage
Tangibility
Ln (1+Borrower Age)
Profitability
Operating Loss Dummy
Beta÷10
Stock Return Volatility
Term Spread (%)
Default Spread (%)
Constant

-0.29***
(-3.28)
0.03
(1.51)
-0.13***
(-5.57)
0.07
(1.08)
-0.19**
(-2.23)
0.06
(0.52)
0.06**
(2.13)
-0.04
(-0.33)
0.08
(1.35)
0.10
(0.33)
0.13
(0.82)
-0.09*
(-1.72)
-0.09
(-1.05)
2.38***
(9.97)

0.03
(1.47)
-0.12***
(-5.40)
0.08
(1.24)
-0.20**
(-2.39)
0.06
(0.51)
0.05*
(1.96)
-0.05
(-0.42)
0.08
(1.29)
0.05
(0.15)
0.15
(0.97)
-0.08
(-1.63)
-0.08
(-0.99)
2.34***
(9.99)

0.03
(1.54)
-0.12***
(-4.84)
0.09
(1.20)
-0.22**
(-2.51)
0.06
(0.50)
0.06**
(1.98)
-0.06
(-0.49)
0.11*
(1.67)
-0.04
(-0.13)
0.18
(1.08)
-0.07
(-1.43)
-0.09
(-1.00)
2.27***
(8.91)

-0.29***
(-3.14)
0.03
(1.59)
-0.12***
(-5.00)
0.08
(1.05)
-0.21**
(-2.36)
0.06
(0.51)
0.06**
(2.13)
-0.05
(-0.40)
0.11*
(1.72)
0.01
(0.04)
0.16
(0.94)
-0.08
(-1.50)
-0.09
(-1.06)
2.31***
(8.95)

Observations
291
291
291
291
Adj. R-squared
0.59
0.59
0.58
0.58
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Table 3
PE-bank relationship and syndicate structure: Expanded regressions
This table reports the OLS regression results on the effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share per facility
(Panel A) and on the facility Herfindahl Index (Panel B) with additional control variables. The sample for all
regressions in this table uses only the 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies. All models also control for year,
industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy variables, but their coefficients and t-statistics are omitted below.
See Appendix A1 for variable definitions. Ln(X) denotes the natural logarithm of variable X. The t-statistics in the
parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity
and clustering at the borrowing company level.
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Name of variable
PE-Bank Relationship ($)

Panel A: Lead bank share
(1)
(2)

Panel B: Herfindahl index
(3)
(4)

-0.27***
(-3.96)

-0.27***
(-3.73)

-0.26***
(-3.69)
-0.07
(-0.48)
0.12***
(3.20)
-0.00
(-0.48)
-0.03
(-1.60)
-0.02**
(-2.04)
-0.10**
(-2.47)
0.10*
(1.72)
-0.07***
(-3.39)
-0.06
(-1.57)
0.00
(0.04)
-0.05**
(-2.37)
0.07
(1.07)
-0.11*
(-1.77)
0.11
(1.15)
0.04*
(1.82)
0.05
(0.72)
0.04
(0.85)
0.08
(0.32)
0.12
(1.14)
-0.07
(-1.64)
-0.08
(-1.19)
2.39***
(10.12)

Lead Lender Reputation
New Lender Dummy
PE Firm Reputation
No. of Fin. Covenants
No. of Non-Fin. Covenants
Performance Pricing Dummy
Secured Loan Dummy
Ln (Loan Amount ($m))
Ln (Maturity)
Market-to-Book
Ln (Market Cap. ($m))
Dividend Payer Dummy
Leverage
Tangibility
Ln (1+Borrower Age)
Profitability
Operating Loss Dummy
Beta÷10
Stock Return Volatility
Term Spread (%)
Default Spread (%)
Constant

-0.03*
(-1.88)
-0.02**
(-2.00)
-0.11**
(-2.51)
0.07
(1.33)
-0.07***
(-3.56)
-0.06*
(-1.66)
0.01
(0.37)
-0.06***
(-2.62)
0.08
(1.21)
-0.13**
(-2.20)
0.10
(1.02)
0.04*
(1.88)
0.01
(0.13)
0.05
(1.14)
0.03
(0.10)
0.06
(0.47)
-0.06
(-1.37)
-0.07
(-0.90)
2.51***
(9.88)

-0.04**
(-2.27)
-0.02*
(-1.89)
-0.09*
(-1.85)
0.10
(1.62)
-0.08***
(-3.52)
-0.07*
(-1.73)
0.01
(0.52)
-0.06**
(-2.35)
0.08
(1.11)
-0.16**
(-2.44)
0.10
(0.94)
0.05*
(1.89)
0.01
(0.10)
0.09
(1.62)
-0.06
(-0.23)
0.08
(0.63)
-0.06
(-1.19)
-0.06
(-0.80)
2.44***
(8.66)

-0.26***
(-3.63)
-0.02
(-0.11)
0.13***
(3.45)
-0.00
(-0.51)
-0.03**
(-2.01)
-0.02*
(-1.91)
-0.08*
(-1.80)
0.12**
(2.08)
-0.07***
(-3.31)
-0.06*
(-1.66)
0.00
(0.20)
-0.05**
(-2.08)
0.07
(0.96)
-0.13**
(-2.06)
0.11
(1.08)
0.04*
(1.86)
0.05
(0.64)
0.07
(1.35)
0.01
(0.03)
0.16
(1.37)
-0.07
(-1.42)
-0.08
(-1.10)
2.28***
(8.73)

Observations
291
291
291
291
Adj. R-squared
0.70
0.72
0.69
0.70
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Table 4
Endogeneity of PE-bank relationship
This table reports the lead bank fixed effects (columns (1) and (2) in Panel A), PE firm fixed effects (columns (3) and
(4) in Panel A), and instrumental variable (IV) (Panel B) regression results on the effect of PE-bank relationships on
the lead bank share. The regressions in this table use the sample of only the 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies.
For brevity, only coefficient estimates of key independent variables are reported. All models also control for year,
industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy variables. The instrument variable (IV) in Panel B, the Highest
Bank Relationship ($), is the highest value of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) for the PE sponsor of the borrowing IPO
company with any banks prior to the current loan. See Appendix A1 for detailed definitions for all other variables.
The t-statistics (z-statistics for the IV regressions) in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated
using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.
Name of variable
Panel A: Fixed effects models
PE-Bank Relationship ($)

Lead bank fixed effects
(1)
-0.34***

(2)
-0.26**

PE fixed effects
(3)
-0.57***

(4)
-0.46**

(-2.65)

(-2.26)

(-3.51)

(-2.41)

Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls

No

Yes

No

Yes

Loan Characteristics Controls

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Borrower Characteristics Controls
Observations

287

287

291

291

Adj. R-squared

0.75

0.82

0.76

0.81

1st Stage
Panel B: Instrumental Variable (IV) methods
Highest Bank Relationship ($)

(1)

2nd Stage
(2)

0.24***

2nd Stage

(3)

(4)

0.23***

(4.17)
Predicted PE-Bank Relationship ($)

1st Stage

(3.02)
-0.51**

-0.77***

(-2.06)

(-2.62)

Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls

No

No

Yes

Yes

Loan Characteristics Controls

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Borrower Characteristics Controls
Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistic

33.53

22.86

Observations
291
291
291
291
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Table 5
Cross-sectional heterogeneity of PE-bank relationship effects
This table reports the regression results on the differential effects of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share per
facility. The regressions in this table use subsamples of the 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies. In Panel A, the
less information asymmetry subsample includes loans to IPO companies with above the sample median average total
assets of borrowing companies. In Panel B, the less information asymmetry subsample includes loans to IPO
companies with below the sample median analyst recommendation standard deviation. In Panel C, the less information
asymmetry subsample includes loans to IPO companies with below the sample median analyst EPS forecast dispersion.
For brevity, only the coefficient estimates of the key independent variables are reported. All models also control for
year, industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy variables. See Appendix A1 for detailed variable
definitions. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.
Less
Greater
Name of variable
information asymmetry
information asymmetry
Panel A: Split sample by size
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
PE-Bank Relationship ($)
-0.19
-0.09
-0.28**
-0.31**
(-0.91)
(-0.60)
(-2.24)
(-2.62)
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls
No
Loan Characteristics Controls
No
Borrower Characteristics Controls
Yes
Observations
111
Adj. R-squared
0.73
Panel B: Split sample by analyst recommendation std.
PE-Bank Relationship ($)
-0.19
(-1.63)
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls
No
Loan Characteristics Controls
No
Borrower Characteristics Controls
Yes
Observations
148
Adj. R-squared
0.62
Panel C: Split sample by analyst EPS forecast std.
PE-Bank Relationship ($)
-0.08
(-0.55)

Yes
Yes
Yes
111
0.78

No
No
Yes
180
0.60

-0.01
(-0.11)

-0.42***
(-2.76)

Yes
Yes
Yes
148
0.77

No
No
Yes
143
0.63

-0.17
(-1.18)

-0.35***
(-3.02)

Yes
Yes
Yes
180
0.74
-0.38***
(-2.63)
Yes
Yes
Yes
143
0.75
-0.26***
(-3.45)

Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
Loan Characteristics Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
Borrower Characteristics Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
128
128
163
163
Adj. R-squared
0.58
0.67
0.72
0.80
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Table 6
PE-bank relationship and additional syndicate characteristics
This table reports the regression results on additional measures of loan syndicate structure. Panel A reports the Poisson
regression results on syndicate size. The dependent variable is the total number of lenders per facility. Four loans with
multiple lead banks are excluded for the regressions in Panel A and the number of lenders is winsorized at ten. The
mean value of the winsorized dependent variable is also reported in Panel A. The mean number of lenders reported in
Panel A is smaller than that in Table 1 due to the winsorization and the exclusion of the four loans with multiple lead
banks. The economic effect of an independent variable in the Poisson regressions can be calculated as the coefficient
multiplied by the mean value of the dependent variable. Panel B reports the logit regression results on the likelihood
of having a foreign participant lender. The dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy variable that is set to one if at
least one of the lenders in the loan syndicate is a foreign bank and zero otherwise. Panel C reports the Poisson
regression results on time-on-the-market (TOM). The dependent variable is the number of days that a loan is in a
syndication process before loan inception. The mean value of TOM is reported at the bottom of Panel C. The
regressions in Panel A and Panel B use subsamples of the 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies with lead share
information. The regressions in Panel C use the 234 loans to both PE-backed and non-PE-backed IPO companies out
of the 2,920 loan facilities for which we have information on TOM. Some loans in the 2,920 facilities do not have
lead share information. All models also control for year, industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy
variables, but their coefficients and z-statistics are omitted below. See Appendix A1 for detailed variable definitions.
The z-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors corrected
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level. For the Logit regressions in Panel B, the
economic effects of PE-Bank Relationship ($) are reported in the brackets below the z-statistics. The economic effect
of an independent variable is calculated as follows: For each observation, we vary the variable from one standard
deviation below to one standard deviation above its actual value if it is a non-binary variable or vary it from zero to
one if it is a dummy variable, and use the coefficients from the Logit regression to calculate the change in the predicted
probability, holding all other variables fixed. We average the change in the predicted probability over all observations
in the sample to get the economic effect.
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Name of variable
PE Sponsor Dummy
PE-Bank Relationship ($)

Panel A: Number
of lenders
(1)
(2)

0.32*
(1.91)

0.27*
(1.83)

Lead Lender Reputation

Panel B: Foreign
bank participation
(3)
(4)

3.10*
(1.92)
[30.3%]

7.98***
(2.61)
[37.2%]
1.08
(0.24)
-1.46
(-1.09)
0.53***
(2.91)
2.15***
(3.23)
0.57
(1.32)
0.85
(0.98)
0.90
(0.57)
1.68***
(3.76)
0.82
(0.99)
-0.69
(-1.32)
1.61**
(2.29)
1.65
(0.74)
-0.83
(-0.32)
4.82*
(1.67)
0.49
(1.03)
-7.15
(-0.78)
2.46
(1.23)
-5.99
(-0.56)
-6.87
(-1.28)
3.18***
(2.63)
0.44
(0.30)
-64.75***
(-6.23)

Panel C: Loan
time-on-market
(5)
(6)
-0.10
-0.42
(-0.58)
(-0.19)
-0.45*
-0.66**
(-1.77)
(-2.16)

-0.31
1.54**
(-1.18)
(2.53)
New Lender Dummy
-0.14*
-0.09
(-1.73)
(-0.64)
PE Firm Reputation
0.01
0.01
(1.04)
(0.33)
No. of Fin. Covenants
0.09***
0.02
(2.95)
(0.39)
No. of Non-Fin. Covenants
0.04**
-0.01
(2.11)
(-0.17)
Performance Pricing Dummy
0.16*
0.17
(1.93)
(1.32)
Secured Loan Dummy
-0.02
0.38
(-0.27)
(1.23)
Ln (Loan Amount ($m))
0.17***
0.11
(4.51)
(1.39)
Ln (Maturity)
0.24***
-0.10
(2.89)
(-0.63)
Market-to-Book
-0.09**
-0.07**
-0.50**
0.00
0.05
(-2.29)
(-2.15)
(-2.11)
(0.04)
(0.87)
Ln (Market Cap. ($m))
0.27***
0.16***
1.63***
0.01
-0.10
(5.14)
(3.64)
(4.25)
(0.18)
(-1.07)
Dividend Payer Dummy
-0.20
-0.11
-0.48
0.00
0.03
(-1.46)
(-0.78)
(-0.44)
(0.01)
(0.21)
Leverage
0.40**
0.36***
0.75
0.57**
0.42
(2.36)
(2.73)
(0.52)
(2.06)
(1.37)
Tangibility
0.02
-0.13
2.08
-1.09***
-1.13**
(0.12)
(-0.77)
(1.56)
(-2.69)
(-2.29)
Ln (1+Borrower Age)
-0.08
-0.07*
0.14
-0.12
-0.05
(-1.42)
(-1.71)
(0.41)
(-1.12)
(-0.54)
Profitability
-0.02
-0.07
-2.69
1.55*
1.20
(-0.07)
(-0.33)
(-1.11)
(1.75)
(1.22)
Operating Loss Dummy
-0.27**
-0.18**
-0.25
-0.04
-0.14
(-2.40)
(-2.00)
(-0.31)
(-0.20)
(-0.62)
Beta÷10
0.53
0.09
-2.19
-0.69
-0.17
(0.75)
(0.17)
(-0.53)
(-0.58)
(-0.14)
Stock Return Volatility
-0.88**
-0.65**
-1.23
0.31
0.14
(-2.38)
(-2.33)
(-0.31)
(0.42)
(0.20)
Term Spread (%)
0.26**
0.18*
1.84**
0.25**
0.29**
(2.26)
(1.76)
(2.51)
(2.01)
(2.27)
Default Spread (%)
0.01
0.10
0.94
1.01**
0.69
(0.07)
(0.66)
(0.82)
(2.17)
(1.22)
Constant
-2.88*** -3.81***
-39.27***
3.74***
4.61***
(-5.41)
(-6.32)
(-8.50)
(5.03)
(4.35)
Mean of the Dependent Variable
5.14
5.14
31.05
31.05
Observations
287
287
278
278
234
234
Adj. R-squared
0.34
0.39
0.57
0.75
0.32
0.36
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Table 7
PE-bank relationship and lead bank share: Robustness checks
The dependent variable is the lead bank share at the package level for the regression in Panel D, and is the lead bank share at the facility level for the regressions
in other panels. We only report the expanded OLS regression results using the sample (subsamples) of 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies. The model
specifications are the same as those in Table 3 but include an additional control variable, Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy in Panel A and PEParticipant Relationship ($) in Panel B. Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy equals one if the lead bank of the current loan is also the lead underwriter
(or one of the lead underwriters) of the borrowing company’s IPO, and zero otherwise. For each participant lender in a loan, we compute a measure for its
relationship with the PE sponsor as the ratio of the dollar amount of loans from this particular bank to this PE firm’s portfolio companies over the dollar amount of
all loans to the PE firm’s portfolio companies during the past five years. PE-Participant Relationship ($) equals the maximum relationship measure for all
participant lenders in the loan, and is set to zero for sole lender loans. Compared to Table 3, Panel C of this table reports the Tobit regressions, and Panel D reports
the OLS regression results for the lead bank share at the package level. Panels E and F report the OLS regressions results separately for credit lines and term loans.
For brevity, only the coefficients of the key independent variables are reported. All other firm-level, loan-level controls and year, industry, loan type, and deal
package purpose dummy variables are included in the estimations in the same way as in Table 3, but their coefficients and t- or z-statistics are not reported below.
See Appendix A1 for detailed variable definitions. The t-/z-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.

Name of variable
PE-Bank Relationship ($)
Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy

Panel A:
IPO
underwriter
overlapping

Panel B:
Relationship
with participant
banks

Panel C:

Panel D:

Panel E:

Panel F:

Tobit
regression

Package
level

Credit
lines

Term
loans

-0.26***

-0.24***

-0.18***

-0.21**

-0.19**

-0.45**

(-3.72)

(-3.75)

(-3.52)

(-2.23)

(-2.33)

(-2.26)

0.09
(1.29)

PE-Participant Relationship ($)

-0.31***
(-4.77)

Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Loan Characteristics Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Borrower Characteristics Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

291

291

291

187

193

95

0.71

0.78

0.92

Adj. R-squared
0.72
0.75
0.85
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Table 8
PE-bank relationship and lead bank share: Full sample results
This table reports the OLS regression results on the effects of PE sponsorships and PE-bank relationships on the lead bank
share per facility for the sample of 1,627 loans to both PE-backed and non-PE-backed IPO companies. We estimate both the
baseline model (columns (1) and (2), for which we only control for the borrower characteristics but not the loan, lender, or
PE characteristics) and the expanded model (columns (3) and (4)). For brevity, only the coefficients of the key independent
variables are reported. All models control for year, industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy variables. See
Appendix A1 for detailed variable definitions. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated
using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.

Name of variable
PE Sponsor Dummy

(1)

(2)

-0.10***
(-3.31)

Strong Relationship Dummy ($)

(3)
(-0.15)

-0.21***

-0.13*

(-4.52)
Weak Relationship Dummy ($)

(-1.69)

-0.08**

-0.01

(-2.28)
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls

No

(4)

-0.01

(-0.15)

No

Yes

Yes

Loan Characteristics Controls

No

No

Yes

Yes

Borrower Characteristics Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,627

1,627

1,627

1,627

Observations

Adj. R-squared
0.43
0.44
0.59
0.60
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.

47

